"Nash-in-Nash" Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work
NBER Working Paper No. 20641
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This paper was previously circulated under the title “Bargaining in Bilateral Oligopoly: An Alternating Offers Representation of the ʽNash-in-Nashʼ Solution.” We would like to thank Elliot Lipnowski, Sebastián Fleitas, and Eli Liebman for excellent research assistance; Attila Ambrus, John Asker, Catherine de Fontenay, Joshua Gans, Patrick Greenlee, Heski Bar-Isaac, Rachel Kranton, Volcker Nocke, Janine Miklos-Thal, Dan O'Brien, Alexander Raskovich, Stan Reynolds, Michael Riordan, Christopher Snyder, Mike Whinston, Tom Wiseman, Ali Yurukoglu, and numerous seminar audiences for useful discussion; and the editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Gowrisankaran acknowledges funding from the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-1425063). The usual disclaimer applies. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.