Vulnerability and Clientelism

Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Simeon Nichter

NBER Working Paper No. 23589
Issued in July 2017, Revised in April 2019
NBER Program(s):The Development Economics Program, The Political Economy Program

This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. We employ a randomized control trial that reduced household vulnerability through a development intervention: constructing residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Brazil. This intervention significantly decreased requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. We also link program beneficiaries to electronic voting machines, and show the intervention decreased votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for clientelism. Findings are observed not only during the election campaign, but also a full year later.

Acknowledgments

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w23589

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