Enforcement Risk and Screening in Rental Markets: Evidence from Eviction Moratoria
Working Paper 32289
DOI 10.3386/w32289
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We combine a hand-collected dataset on state eviction moratoria with a nationwide field experiment of more than 25,000 rental inquiries to study how contract enforcement affects screening in rental housing markets. Using staggered moratorium expirations, we show that property managers discriminated more against minority renters when eviction enforcement was suspended. Linking inquiries to tenant address histories, we find that non-responses translated into different move-in patterns and reduced property owners’ returns through foregone leasing opportunities. A simple search model rationalizes these responses as property managers re-optimize when enforcement is suspended.
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Copy CitationAlina Arefeva, Kay Jowers, Qihui Hu, and Christopher Timmins, "Enforcement Risk and Screening in Rental Markets: Evidence from Eviction Moratoria," NBER Working Paper 32289 (2024), https://doi.org/10.3386/w32289.Download Citation
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