Enforcement Risk and Screening in Rental Markets: Evidence from Eviction Moratoria
We study how contract enforcement shapes screening by intermediaries in the U.S. rental market, where eviction enforces leases and tenant selection is delegated to property managers. We combine a hand-collected record of state eviction moratoria with a nationwide field experiment of more than 25,000 inquiries. Exploiting staggered moratorium expirations, we show that property managers discriminated more while eviction was unenforceable, redirecting responses from African American toward white applicants without changing their overall responsiveness. The reallocation altered who ultimately moved in and is consistent with statistical discrimination: a benefit–cost calculation shows that the screening was privately profitable despite being illegal.
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Copy CitationAlina Arefeva, Qihui Hu, and Christopher Timmins, "Enforcement Risk and Screening in Rental Markets: Evidence from Eviction Moratoria," NBER Working Paper 32289 (2024), https://doi.org/10.3386/w32289.Download Citation
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