Infrastructure Investment and Labor Monopsony Power
In this paper we study whether or not transportation infrastructure disrupts local monopsony power in labor markets using an expansion of the national highway system in India. Using panel data on manufacturing firms, we find that monopsony power in labor markets is reduced among firms near newly constructed highways relative to firms that remain far from highways. We estimate that the highways reduce labor markdowns significantly. We use changes in the composition of inputs to identify these effects separately from the reduction of output markups that occurs simultaneously. The impacts of highway construction are therefore pro-competitive in both output and input markets, and act to increase the share of income that labor receives by 1.8--2.3 percentage points.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. Financial support from CEPR's STEG research programme is gratefully acknowledged. Kaboski has significant financial relationships with Yale University's YRISE, the IMF, and STEG.
Wyatt J. Brooks & Joseph P. Kaboski & Illenin O. Kondo & Yao Amber Li & Wei Qian, 2021. "Infrastructure Investment and Labor Monopsony Power," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(3), pages 470-504, September. citation courtesy of