NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Hunt Allcott, Richard Sweeney

NBER Working Paper No. 20048
Issued in April 2014, Revised in March 2015

---- Acknowledgments ----

Previously circulated as "Information Disclosure through Agents: Evidence from a Field Experiment." We thank Judd Boomhower, Lucas Davis, Stefano DellaVigna, Carolyn Fischer, Ginger Jin, Katy Milkman, Erich Muehlegger, David Rapson, Imran Rasul, Jim Sallee, and seminar participants at the ASSA Annual Meeting, Berkeley, Harvard, and the Program on Workable Energy Regulation conference for helpful comments. Alex Cheng provided exceptional research assistance, and Larry Ehrhardt programmed the experiment website. Our legal agreement does not allow us to identify the Retailer or its employees, but we thank sales agents and management, in particular PC and JW. Customer follow-up survey protocols and Stata code to replicate the analysis is available from Hunt Allcott's website. We are grateful to the Sloan Foundation for funding this experiment and our related research on the economics of energy efficiency. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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