NBER Working Paper No. 18587
We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex-post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that moral hazard effects are limited if bailouts are systemic and broad-based. If bailouts are idiosyncratic and targeted, however, this makes the economy significantly more exposed to financial crises.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w18587
Published: Javier Bianchi, 2016. "Efficient Bailouts?," American Economic Review, vol 106(12), pages 3607-3659. citation courtesy of
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