Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm.
This paper developed out of work done independently by the authors, most importantly a paper by Avery titled "Preferences and Signaling in a Matching Market." We thank Jeremy Bulow for suggesting a collaboration and providing detailed suggestions. Levin thanks the Toulouse Network on Information Technology for research support. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Christopher Avery & Jonathan Levin, 2010. "Early Admissions at Selective Colleges," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2125-56, December. citation courtesy of