Estimating Matching Games with Transfers
I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market. I apply the estimator to data on the car parts supplied by automotive suppliers to estimate the returns from different portfolios of parts to suppliers and automotive assemblers.
Thanks to SupplierBusiness as well as Thomas Klier for help with the work on automotive supplier specialization. I thank the National Science Foundation, the NET Institute, the Olin Foundation, and the Stigler Center for generous funding. Thanks to helpful comments from colleagues and workshop participants at many universities and conferences. Chenchuan Li, David Santiago, Louis Serranito and Chenyu Yang provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Jeremy T. Fox, 2018. "Estimating matching games with transfers," Quantitative Economics, vol 9(1), pages 1-38. citation courtesy of