An Experimental Evaluation of Notification Strategies to Increase Property Tax Compliance: Free-Riding in the City of Brotherly Love
This study evaluates a set of notification strategies intended to increase property tax collection. To test these strategies, we develop a field experiment in collaboration with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue. The resulting notification strategies draw on core rationales for tax compliance: deterrence, the need to finance the provision of public goods and services, as well as an appeal to civic duty. Our empirical findings provide evidence that carefully designed and targeted notification strategies can modestly improve tax compliance.
The research reported here was supported in part by the Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, through Grant #R305B090015 to the University of Pennsylvania. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Institute or the U.S. Department of Education.Holger Sieg
The authors would like to thank the Public Policy Initiative of the Wharton School and the Jerry Lee Center of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania for financial support for this study.