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1. J. Andreoni, D. Aydin, B. Barton, D. Bernheim, and J. Naecker, "When Fair Isn't Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals Involving Social Preferences," NBER Working Paper No. 25257, November 2018, and forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy, shows that non-consequentialism in social preferences is essential.   Go to ⤴︎
2. J. Andreoni, "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving," The Economic Journal, 100(401), 1990, pp. 464–77. The term "warm-glow" is slightly pejorative. The intent is to remind readers that, although the reduced form may help answer many questions, there is still much to learn by unlocking the ways warm-glow comes about. See also J. Andreoni, "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, 97(6), 1989, pp. 1447–58. On social-image in unselfish behavior, see J. Andreoni and B.D. Bernheim, "Social Image and the 50–50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects," Econometrica 77(5), 2009, pp.1607–36.   Go to ⤴︎
3. A. Payne, "Does the Government Crowd Out Private Donations? New Evidence From a Sample of Non-Profit Firms," Journal of Public Economics, 69(3), 1998, pp. 323–45.   Go to ⤴︎
4. This conclusion can also be reached by invoking the non-distribution constraint imposed on non-profits: Charity managers are accepting as part of their compensation the personal satisfaction of doing good works, not simply engaging in onerous fundraising. Another way to motivate fundraising is to assume that charities vary qualitatively — two disaster relief organizations can be imperfect substitutes if one provides mostly food aid while the other specializes in medical aid. Suppose donors differ by how much they favor food over medical aid. If both charities approach a donor, the donor will give to the charity that represents her preferences best. If only one charity calls to ask for a donation, then the donor will give, but will give less the further the charity is from the donor's ideal quality. Thus, charities setting fundraising expenditures face both extensive and intensive motivations for seeking donations. This model is developed in J. Andreoni and A. Payne, "Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising?" American Economic Review, 93(3), 2003, pp. 792–812.   Go to ⤴︎
5. This result is due to J. Andreoni, "Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-raising," Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1998, pp. 1186–213. The theory was tested and confirmed in a field experiment by J. List and D. Lucking-Reiley, "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 2002, pp. 215–33.   Go to ⤴︎
6. J. Andreoni, "Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-Raising," Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8(1), 2006, pp. 1–22. For a related model, see L. Vesterlund, "The Informational Value of Sequential Fundraising," Journal of Public Economics, 87(3-4), 2003, pp. 627–57, and tests of these ideas by A. Bracha, M. Menietti, and L. Vesterlund, "Seeds to Succeed: Sequential Giving to Public Projects," Journal of Public Economics, 95(5-6), 2011, pp. 416–27.   Go to ⤴︎
7. Ibid, J. Andreoni and A. Payne, American Economic Review, 2003.   Go to ⤴︎
8. J. Andreoni and A. Payne, "Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence From a Panel of Charities," NBER Working Paper No. 16372, September 2010, and Journal of Public Economics, 95(5–6), 2011, pp. 334–43.   Go to ⤴︎
9. J. Andreoni and A. Payne, "Crowding-Out Charitable Contributions in Canada: New Knowledge From the North," NBER Working Paper No. 17635, December 2011.   Go to ⤴︎
10. J. Andreoni, A. Payne, and S. Smith, "Do Grants to Charities Crowd Out Other Income? Evidence from the UK," NBER Working Paper No. 18998, April 2013, and Journal of Public Economics, 114, 2014, pp. 75–86.   Go to ⤴︎
11. J. Andreoni, J. Rao, and H. Trachtman, "Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy, and Charitable Giving," NBER Working Paper No. 17648, December 2011, and Journal of Political Economy 125(3), 2017, pp. 625–53.   Go to ⤴︎
12. J. Andreoni and M. Serra-Garcia, "Time-Inconsistent Charitable Giving," NBER Working Paper No. 22824, November 2016. Go to ⤴︎

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