Loaded Chambers: Organized Interests, Public Opinion, and Policy Responsiveness in the American States

Organized interests are thought to influence policy, but whether and when interest group money overrides public opinion remains poorly understood. We investigate how gun interest group money and public opinion shape state gun laws. To test which force drives policy, we link 25 years of campaign finance records to a novel Gun Law Index paired with original estimates of constituent sentiment, 2000--2024. We show that pro-gun contributions produce deregulatory changes under Republican trifectas, while gun safety contributions generate regulatory tightening under Democratic trifectas. Using an instrumental variable design, we find that constituent sentiment does not causally predict policy change under Republican or Democratic trifectas. We document one of the most striking failures of democratic responsiveness in the history of the American Republic: while the twelve states in which universal background checks command at least 90% support have adopted them, only 8 other states have done so among the 36 states that have support between 80-90%, while assault weapons bans and concealed carry restrictions also enjoy durable majority support across 36 states, yet there has been far greater deregulation than regulation for both measures. These patterns provide unequivocal evidence that organized interests, rather than constituent preferences, drive gun policy in the United States.