Dynamic Pricing Regulation and Welfare in Insurance Markets
While the traditional role of insurers is to provide protection against individuals’ idiosyncratic risks, insurers themselves face substantial uncertainties due to aggregate shocks. To prevent insurers from passing these aggregate risks onto consumers, governments have increasingly adopted dynamic pricing regulations, which limit insurers’ ability to change premiums over time. We evaluate dynamic pricing regulation using an equilibrium model of the U.S. long-term care insurance market, featuring insurers’ lack of commitment and endogenous market structures. We find that stricter dynamic pricing regulation has a limited impact on improving consumer welfare, while it reduces insurer profits and increases market concentration.
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Copy CitationNaoki Aizawa and Ami Ko, "Dynamic Pricing Regulation and Welfare in Insurance Markets," NBER Working Paper 30952 (2023), https://doi.org/10.3386/w30952.Download Citation
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Published Versions
Naoki Aizawa & Ami Ko, 2025. "Dynamic Pricing Regulation and Welfare in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, vol 133(8), pages 2371-2413.