Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model
We provide a unified analysis of taxation and taxpayer education when individuals have an incomplete understanding of a complex tax system. The analysis is independent of whether income is earned legitimately, or by avoiding or evading taxes. In this sense, learning about tax minimization strategies (tax manipulation) is similar to learning about the tax code. The government in our model balances a trade-off: A better understanding of the tax system potentially allows taxpayers to optimize more effectively, but also affects government revenue. Optimal taxpayer education and the optimal amount of redistribution can both be characterized ex post by aggregate sufficient statistics that do not require information about how biases or behavioral responses vary across the decision margins.
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Copy CitationAshley C. Craig and Joel Slemrod, "Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model," NBER Working Paper 30151 (2022), https://doi.org/10.3386/w30151.Download Citation
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Published Versions
Ashley C. Craig & Joel Slemrod, 2024. "Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, vol 2(2), pages 298-334.
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