The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision
Why do firms outsource research and development (R&D) for some products while conducting R&D in-house for similar ones? An innovating rm risks cannibalizing its existing products. The more profitable these products, the more the firm wants to limit cannibalization. We apply this logic to the organization of R&D by introducing a novel theoretical model in which developing in-house provides the firm more control over the new product's location in product space. An empirical analysis of our testable predictions using pharmaceutical data concerning patents, patent expiration, and outsourcing at various stages of the R&D process supports our theoretical approach.
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Copy CitationThomas Jungbauer, Sean Nicholson, June Pan, Michael Waldman, and Lucy Xiaolu Wang, "The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision," NBER Working Paper 28379 (2021), https://doi.org/10.3386/w28379.Download Citation
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Published Versions
Thomas Jungbauer & Sean Nicholson & June Pan & Michael Waldman & Lucy Xiaolu Wang, 2026. "The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol 18(2), pages 56-109.
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