The Effect of Managers on Systematic Risk
Tracking the movement of top managers across firms, we document the importance of manager-specific fixed effects in explaining heterogeneity in firm exposures to systematic risk. In equilibrium, manager fixed effects on systematic risk are positively related with manager fixed effects on stock returns. These differences in systematic risk are partially explained by managers’ corporate strategies, such as their preferences for internal growth and financial conservatism. Managers’ early-career experiences of starting their first job in a recession also contribute to differential loadings on systematic risk. These effects are more pronounced when managers wield more influence, as in smaller firms and firms that do not have an independent board. Overall, our results suggest that managers play an important role in shaping a firm’s systematic risk.
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Copy CitationAntoinette Schoar, Kelvin Yeung, and Luo Zuo, "The Effect of Managers on Systematic Risk," NBER Working Paper 27487 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3386/w27487.Download Citation
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Published Versions
Antoinette Schoar & Kelvin Yeung & Luo Zuo, 2024. "The Effect of Managers on Systematic Risk," Management Science, vol 70(2), pages 815-833.
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