Covid-19, Shelter-In Place Strategies and Tipping
Social distancing via shelter-in-place strategies has emerged as the most effective way to combat Covid-19. In the United States, choices about such policies are made by individual states. Here we show that the policy choice made by one state influences the incentives that other states face to adopt similar policies: they can be viewed as strategic complements in a supermodular game. If they satisfy the condition of uniform strict increasing differences then following Heal and Kunreuther () we show that if enough states engage in social distancing, they will tip others to do the same and thus shift the Nash equilibrium with respect to the number of states engaging in social distancing.
Support for this research comes from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.