A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information
---- Acknowledgments ----
We thank Fernando Alvarez, Markus Brunnermeier, Sergei Glebkin, Jakub Kastl, Felix Kubler, George Mailath, Aviv Nevo, Andy Postlewaite, Tomasso Porzio, Giacomo Rondina, Laura Veldkamp, Neil Wallace and seminar participants at Central Bank of Chile, EIEF, EUI, Penn State, Princeton, UBC, UCLA, UCSD, UPenn, San Francisco Fed, Wharton, Zurich, the 2017 Cowles Conference on General Equilibrium at Yale, the 2017 SED Meetings in Edinburgh, and the 2018 FIRS Conference in Barcelona for comments. The usual waiver of liability applies. Harold Cole received support from the NSF through grant #1726976. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.