Financial Constraints, Institutions, and Foreign Ownership
This paper examines how external finance dependence, financial development, and institutions influence brownfield foreign direct investment (FDI). We develop a model of cross-border acquisitions in which the foreign acquirer's choice of ownership structure reflects a trade-off between easing target credit constraints and the costs of operating in an environment of low institutional quality. Using a dataset of cross-border acquisitions in emerging markets, we find evidence supporting the central predictions of the model that: (i) a foreign firm is more likely to fully acquire a target firm in sectors that are more reliant on external finance, or in countries with lower financial development/higher institutional quality; (ii) the level of foreign ownership in partially foreign-owned firms is insensitive to institutional factors and depends weakly on financial factors; (iii) the share of foreign acquisitions in all acquisition activity is also higher in external finance dependent sectors, or financially under-developed/high institutional quality countries; and (iv) sectoral external finance dependence accentuates the effect of country-level financial development and institutional quality. The theory and empirical evidence provide insight into the interaction between the financial, institutional and technological determinants of North-South brown field FDI.
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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w24241
Published: Ron Alquist & Nicolas Berman & Rahul Mukherjee & Linda L. Tesar, 2019. "Financial constraints, institutions, and foreign ownership," Journal of International Economics, .
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