Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction System
NBER Working Paper No. 24024
---- Acknowledgments ----
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the U.S. Department of the Treasury or the National Bureau of Economic Research. We thank Philip Haile, Kenneth Hendricks, Darrell Duffie, Paulo Somaini, Terry Belton and participants of the U.S. Treasury Roundtable, 2015 NBER IO Summer Meetings and 2015 NBER Market Design Meeting for their valuable comments. Kastl is grateful for the financial support of the NSF (SES-1352305) and the Sloan Foundation, Hortaçsu the financial support of the NSF (SES-1124073, ICES-1216083, and SES-1426823). All remaining errors are ours.
---- Disclosure of Financial Relationships for Jakub Kastl ----
April 26, 2016
As a coauthor of the submitted paper, I, Jakub Kastl, declare that I had no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in the paper during the time the paper was written. I have since consulted for a law firm on the issue of primary dealers' collusion.
I received support from the NSF (SES-1352305) and the Sloan Foundation (Sloan Research Fellowship) while working on this paper.