NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Allen Zhang

Department of the Treasury

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Institutional Affiliation: U.S. Department of the Treasury

NBER Working Papers and Publications

November 2017Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction System
with Ali Hortaçsu, Jakub Kastl: w24024
We analyze bidding data from uniform price auctions of U.S. Treasury bills and notes between July 2009-October 2013. Primary dealers consistently bid higher yields compared to direct and indirect bidders. We estimate a structural model of bidding that takes into account informational asymmetries introduced by the bidding system employed by the U.S. Treasury. While primary dealers’ estimated willingness-to-pay is higher than direct and indirect bidders’, their ability to bid-shade is even higher, leading to higher yield/lower price bids. Total bidder surplus averaged to about 3 basis points across the sample period along with efficiency losses around 2 basis points.
 
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