Optimal Social Security Claiming Behavior under Lump Sum Incentives: Theory and Evidence
NBER Working Paper No. 23073
---- Acknowledgments ----
Research support was provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), the German Investment and Asset Management Association (BVI), the Pension Research Council/Boettner Center at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, the Metzler Exchange Professor program, and the Berkley Fellowship Program at the School of Risk Management of St. John’s University’s Tobin College of Business. We also acknowledge support from the Research Center SAFE, funded by the State of Hessen initiative for research excellence, LOEWE. We thank the Center for Scientific Computing of the Goethe University Frankfurt for granting us computing time at the supercomputer LOEWE-CSC. We are grateful for expert programming assistant from Yong Yu, as well as the RAND ALP team including Alerk Amin, Tim Colvin, and Diana Malouf. Opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not represent the opinions or policy of any agency of the Federal Government, nor of any other institution with which the authors are affiliated, nor of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
---- Disclosure of Financial Relationships for Olivia S. Mitchell ----
Mitchell serves as an Independent Trustee for the Wells Fargo Advantage Funds and has received more than $10,000 from the TIAA Institute for research on retirement security.