Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II
NBER Working Paper No. 22992
---- Acknowledgments ----
For helpful comments we thank Ran Abramitzky, Karol Borowiecki, Ernesto Dal Bó, Daniel Chen, Paul David, Thomas Dohmen, David Dorn, Barry Eichengreen, Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Raquel Fernandez, Joe Ferrie, Bruno Frey, Paul Gertler, Morgan Hardy, Mitch Hoffman, Simon Jäger, Patrick Kline, Jonathan Leonard, David Levine, Jason Long, Joel Mokyr, Petra Moser, Susanne Neckermann, Ignacio Palacios‐Huerta, Michael Peters, Konrad Raff, Debraj Ray, Christy Romer, Mara Squiccarini, David Stasavage, Noam Yuchtman, and Fabrizio Zilibotti as well as seminar audiences at the AEA meetings, Academy of Behavioral Economics, Bonn, NYU, Northwestern, Stanford, UC Berkeley, UC Berkeley Haas, Southern Denmark, and Zurich. We are indebted to Veit Scherzer for general advice and generous help in dealing with German World War II data, and to Jim Perry and Tony Wood for sharing their data. We thank Jacob Miller and Lukas Leucht for outstanding research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.