Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance
---- Acknowledgments ----
This paper was supported by a grant from the Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality (1R03HS023628-01, PI: David Powell) and the National Institute on Aging (P01AG033559). Funding from the Bing Center for Health Economics is also gratefully acknowledged. We received helpful comments from seminar participants at the Annual Health Economics Conference, Annual Health Econometrics Workshop, Conference of the American Society of Health Economists, Midwest Health Economics Conference, RAND, and USC. We are especially grateful to our discussants James Marton, Frank Windmeijer, Mireille Jacobson, and David Frisvold. We also received helpful comments from Abby Alpert, James Burgess, Norma Coe, Peter Huckfeldt, Tim Layton, Chuck Phelps, Julian Reif, and Travis Smith. We are especially grateful to Jean Roth for help with the data and to Dan Feenberg and Mohan Ramanujan for their help with the NBER Unix servers. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of AHRQ, NIH, or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
---- Disclosure of Financial Relationships for Dana Goldman ----
Dana Goldman is a founder of Precision Health Economics, a consultancy providing expertise to the life sciences industry.