The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education Choice
We develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match based on the economic value of marriage and on preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage households (married or single) save, supply labor and consume private and public commodities under uncertainty. Marriage thus has the dual role of providing public goods and offering risk sharing. The model is estimated using the British HPS.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w21004
Published: Pierre-André Chiappori & Monica Costa Dias & Costas Meghir, 2018. "The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice," Journal of Political Economy, vol 126(S1), pages S26-S72.
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