Old and Young Politicians
We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity.
We thank Tommaso Nannicini for many helpful discussions and for generously sharing data on Italian municipalities. We are grateful to participants in a seminar at the University of Michigan. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Alberto Alesina & Traviss Cassidy & Ugo Troiano, 2019. "Old and Young Politicians," Economica, vol 86(344), pages 689-727. citation courtesy of