NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency

Francesco Bianchi, Leonardo Melosi

NBER Working Paper No. 20566
Issued in October 2014

---- Acknowledgments ----

We wish to thank Martin Eichenbaum, Cristina Fuentes-Albero, Jordi Gali, Pablo Guerron-Quintana, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Narayana Kocherlakota, Frederick Mishkin, Matthias Paustian, Jon Steinsson, Mirko Wiederholt, Michael Woodford, and Tony Yates for very helpful comments and discussions. We also thank seminar participants at the NBER Summer Institute, Columbia University, UC Berkeley, Duke University, the SED conference in Cyprus, the Bank of England, the ECB Conference "Information, Beliefs and Economic Policy," the Midwest Macro Meetings 2014, and the Philadelphia Fed. Part of this paper was written while Leonardo Melosi was visiting the Bank of England, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. Francesco Bianchi gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation through grant SES-1227397.

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