NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Jonathan Levin, Andrzej Skrzypacz

NBER Working Paper No. 20487
Issued in September 2014

---- Acknowledgments ----

We thank Chiara Farronato, Maarten Janssen, Paul Klemperer, Erik Madsen, David Salant and Ernesto Wandeler for useful comments and discussions. The authors have advised bidders and the U.S. Federal Communications Commission on radio spectrum auctions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

---- Disclosure of Financial Relationships for Jonathan Levin ----

As noted in the Acknowledgments, I have worked as a consultant to telecommunications companies bidding in radio spectrum auctions. I also am advising the Federal Communications Commission on the design of the US incentive auctions for broadcast television licenses. None of these parties has reviewed this paper.

---- Disclosure of Financial Relationships for Andrzej Skrzypacz ----

As noted in the Acknowledgments, I have worked as a consultant to telecommunications companies bidding in radio spectrum auctions. None of these parties has reviewed this paper.

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