Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements
We provide a simple but novel model of trade agreements that highlights the role of transaction costs, renegotiation and dispute settlement. The model allows us to characterize the appropriate remedy for breach and whether the agreement should be structured as a system of "property rights" or "liability rules." We then study how the optimal rules depend on the underlying economic and contracting environment. Our model also delivers predictions about the outcome of trade disputes, and in particular about the propensity of countries to settle early versus "fighting it out."
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Copy CitationGiovanni Maggi and Robert W. Staiger, "Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements," NBER Working Paper 15460 (2009), https://doi.org/10.3386/w15460.Download Citation
Published Versions
“The Role of Dispute Settlement Proc edures in International Trade Agreements,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol. 126(1), pp. 475 - 515, February 2011 (with Robert Staiger).
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