Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men?
The nineteenth century witnessed dramatic improvements in the legal rights of married women. Given that these changes took place long before women gained the right to vote, they amounted to a voluntary renouncement of power by men. In this paper, we investigate men's incentives for sharing power with women. In our model, women's legal rights set the marital bargaining power of husbands and wives. We show that men face a tradeoff between the rights they want for their own wives (namely none) and the rights of other women in the economy. Men prefer other men's wives to have rights because men care about their own daughters and because an expansion of women's rights increases educational investments in children. We show that men may agree to relinquish some of their power once technological change increases the importance of human capital. We corroborate our argument with historical evidence on the expansion of women's rights in England and the United States.
We thank Stefania Albanesi, Jeremy Greenwood, Bob Hall, Simon Johnson, Larry Jones, Ethan Kaplan, Pete Klenow, John Knowles, Yishay Maoz, Bob Pollak, Victor Rios-Rull, as well as the audiences at a number of conferences and seminars for valuable comments that helped to improve the paper. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (grants SES-0217051 and SES-0519324), the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Michelle Clayman Institute is gratefully acknowledged. Simeon Alder, Wendi Goh, and Alejandrina Salcedo-Cisneros provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Matthias Doepke & Michèle Tertilt, 2009. "Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1541-1591, November. citation courtesy of