Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default
Published Date
Copyright 2016
DOI 10.1111/jeea.12168
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Copy CitationPablo D'Erasmo and Enrique G. Mendoza, Sovereign Debt and Financial Crises (Wiley, Journal of the European Economic Association 14(1), 2013), chap. 2, https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/sovereign-debt-and-financial-crises/distributional-incentives-equilibrium-model-domestic-sovereign-default.
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