A Note on Internationally Coordinated Policy Packages Intended to be Robust Under Model Uncertainty
Jeffrey Frankel, Scott Erwin, Katharine Rockett
NBER Working Paper No. 3747 (Also Reprint No. r1761)
Holtham and Hughes Hallett, and a number of other authors, have suggested that a printout of all 1,000 cases of coordination considered in Frankel and Rockett (1988) should be made available. They wish to check whether, if coordination is restricted to policy packages that they call 'strong' bargains, it would raise welfare a higher percentage of the time. We now make those results available. The results show that if coordination is restricted to packages that are robust with respect to model uncertainty, such as the so-called 'strong' bargains, it does indeed improve the odds in favor of gains from coordination.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w3747
Published: "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model: Reply," American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 4,pp. 1052-1056 (September 1992).
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