Working it out: Randomized Modification and Entrepreneurial Effort in a Collateralized Debt Market
We enrich a standard debt overhang model with liquidity constraints to guide the design and interpretation of a collateralized debt modification experiment on a publicly traded lender’s delinquent vehicle loans to minibus entrepreneurs. Liquidity constraints add another borrower incentive compatibility constraint that interacts with debt overhang to shape repayment and effort. Consistent with model predictions, we find: debt reduction does not affect liquidity constrained borrowers; payment reduction improves both repayment and effort for borrowers with sufficient vehicle equity; payment reduction induces repayment without effort increases for low-equity borrowers. These results suggest a pecking order strategy for modification practice and policy.
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Copy CitationChristopher Eaglin, Apoorv Gupta, Filippo Mezzanotti, and Jonathan Zinman, "Working it out: Randomized Modification and Entrepreneurial Effort in a Collateralized Debt Market," NBER Working Paper 34398 (2025), https://doi.org/10.3386/w34398.
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