Frames, Incentives, and Education: Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension Claiming
Many people forgo a higher stream of public pension income by claiming early. We provide both quasi-experimental and survey-experimental evidence that the timing of public pension claiming is relatively inelastic to changes in financial incentives in Canada. Using the survey experiment, we evaluate the effect of two different educational interventions and different ways of framing the incentive to delay claiming. While all three types of interventions induce delays, these interventions have heterogeneous financial consequences for participants who react.
We gratefully acknowledge valuable input by Olivia S. Mitchell, Jean-Claude Ménard, Bernard Morency, René Beaudry, Michel St-Germain, David Boisclair, Colin Busby, Martin Boyer, Philippe d'Astous, Arthur van Soest, Jochem de Bresser and Rob Alessie. We would also like to thank conference and seminar participants at various venues, including NETSPAR, IRPP, Aussois CNRS, UNSW and CEPAR, for comments on earlier versions of the paper. The authors thank François Laliberté-Auger, Yann Décarie, and Kangyu Qiu for excellent research assistance. They also acknowledge the CRDCN network for allowing access to administrative data from Revenue Canada and Delvinia for conducting the survey experiment. The authors acknowledge funding from the Social Science Research Council (SSHRC) as well as the Fonds de recherche du Québec société et culture. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.