Exorbitant Privilege? Quantitative Easing and the Bond Market Subsidy of Prospective Fallen Angels
Working Paper 29777
DOI 10.3386/w29777
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We document capital misallocation in the U.S. investment-grade (IG) corporate bond market, driven by quantitative easing (QE). Prospective fallen angels—risky firms just above the IG cutoff—enjoyed subsidized bond financing in 2009-19. This effect is driven by prolonged cumulative Fed purchases of securities inducing long-duration IG-focused investors to rebalance their portfolios towards higher-yielding IG bonds. The benefiting firms (i) exploited the sluggish downward adjustment of credit ratings after M&A to finance risky acquisitions with bond issuances, (ii) increased market share affecting competitors' employment and investment, but (iii) suffered severe downgrades at the onset of the pandemic.
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Copy CitationViral V. Acharya, Ryan Banerjee, Matteo Crosignani, Tim Eisert, and Renée Spigt, "Exorbitant Privilege? Quantitative Easing and the Bond Market Subsidy of Prospective Fallen Angels," NBER Working Paper 29777 (2022), https://doi.org/10.3386/w29777.
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