Collusion, Mergers, and Related Antitrust Issues
This survey examines recent developments in economic research relating to antitrust, paying specific attention to research in the areas of collusion and merger enforcement. Research relating to both collusion and mergers has made significant advances in the last twenty years. With respect to collusion, this includes important theoretical and empirical work on the sustainability, structure, and impact of collusive schemes. With respect to mergers, this includes important work on the impact of enforcement institutions, both theoretical and empirical work on unilateral effects, and theoretical work on the selection of which mergers get proposed to antitrust agencies and optimal policy in the face of that selection. A feature of recent research is the increasing complementarity between empirical work (ranging from observational studies to model-based measurement) and theoretical work in advancing our understanding of collusive and merger-related phenomena.
We would like to thank Lorenzo Cattivelli, Masha Melkonyan and Kylie Toh for excellent research assistance. We are deeply grateful for comments from Lu´ıs Cabral, Joe Harrington, Nathan Miller, Rob Porter, Devesh Raval, Nicolas Schutz, and Lucy White. Nocke gratefully acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (Project B03). The usual caveat applies. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.