The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees
    Working Paper 27454
  
        
    DOI 10.3386/w27454
  
        
    Issue Date 
  
          We study the long-run outcomes associated with hedge funds' compensation structure. Over a 22-year period, the aggregate effective incentive fee rate is 2.5 times the average contractual rate (i.e., around 50% instead of 20%). Overall, investors collected 36 cents for every dollar earned on their invested capital (over a risk-free hurdle rate and before adjusting for any risk). In the cross-section of funds, there is a substantial disconnect between lifetime performance and incentive fees earned. These poor outcomes stem from the asymmetry of the performance contract, investors' return-chasing behavior, and underwater fund closures.
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      Copy CitationItzhak Ben-David, Justin Birru, and Andrea Rossi, "The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees," NBER Working Paper 27454 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3386/w27454.
Non-Technical Summaries
- Data on 5,917 hedge funds over 22 years suggest that after incentive fees and management fees are assessed, investors received only...
 
     
    