Interest Rates and the Design of Financial Contracts
    Working Paper 27195
  
        
    DOI 10.3386/w27195
  
        
    Issue Date 
  
                
    Revision Date 
  
          We show that the partial response of loan rates to interest rate changes, referred to in the bank lending literature as “stickiness,” is a feature of perfect capital markets. No-arbitrage models of credit risk are able to replicate empirical interest rate sensitivities. However, the widespread use of interest rate floors in the low-rate environment of the last decade is a result of risk-sharing and incentive considerations arising from market imperfections. Floors reallocate cash flows across states in a way that loan spreads cannot. They insure lenders against losses if rates fall, while mitigating borrower moral hazard if rates rise.
- 
        
- 
      Copy CitationMichael R. Roberts and Michael Schwert, "Interest Rates and the Design of Financial Contracts," NBER Working Paper 27195 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3386/w27195.
- 
        
- 
        
 
     
    