The Allocation of Decision Authority to Human and Artificial Intelligence
NBER Working Paper No. 26673
The allocation of decision authority by a principal to either a human agent or an artificial intelligence (AI) is examined. The principal trades off an AI’s more aligned choice with the need to motivate the human agent to expend effort in learning choice payoffs. When agent effort is desired, it is shown that the principal is more likely to give that agent decision authority, reduce investment in AI reliability and adopt an AI that may be biased. Organizational design considerations are likely to impact on how AI’s are trained.
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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w26673
Published: Susan C. Athey & Kevin A. Bryan & Joshua S. Gans, 2020. "The Allocation of Decision Authority to Human and Artificial Intelligence," AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol 110, pages 80-84. citation courtesy of