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Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception

Judd B. Kessler, Corinne Low, Colin Sullivan

NBER Working Paper No. 25800
Issued in May 2019, Revised in May 2019
NBER Program(s):Economics of Education Program, Labor Studies Program, Public Economics Program

We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w25800

Published: Judd B. Kessler & Corinne Low & Colin D. Sullivan, 2019. "Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception," American Economic Review, vol 109(11), pages 3713-3744.

 
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