Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement
NBER Working Paper No. 25463
---- Acknowledgments ----
This paper subsumes an earlier working paper "Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement." We would like to thank Manuel Amador, Dirk Bergemann, Hector Chade, V.V. Chari, Stephen Coate, Georgy Egorov, Simone Galperti, Johannes H�rner, Zhen Huo, Navin Kartik, George Mailath, Guido Menzio, Chris Moser, and conference and seminar audiences for helpful comments. We are grateful to Marco Bassetto, Dana Foarta, Juan Ortner, and Chris Phelan for valuable discussions of the paper. Jan Knoepfle, George Vojta, and Weijie Zhong provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.