NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense

Amanda Agan, Matthew Freedman, Emily Owens

NBER Working Paper No. 24579
Issued in May 2018
NBER Program(s):Law and Economics Program, Labor Studies Program

Governments in the U.S. must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. These services are frequently provided by assigned counsel, who handle cases for indigent defendants on a contract basis. Court-assigned attorneys generally garner worse case outcomes than privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records from one large jurisdiction in Texas, we find that the disparities in outcomes are primarily attributable to case characteristics and within-attorney differences across cases in which they are assigned versus retained. The selection of low-quality lawyers into assigned counsel and endogenous matching in the private market contribute less to the disparities.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w24579

 
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