Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies
We analyze the efficient subsidy for durable good technologies. We theoretically demonstrate that a policymaker faces a tension between intertemporally price discriminating by designing a subsidy that increases over time and taking advantage of future technological progress by designing a subsidy that decreases over time. Using dynamic estimates of household preferences for residential solar in California, we show that the efficient subsidy increases over time. The regulator's spending quintuples when households anticipate future technological progress and future subsidies.
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Copy CitationAshley Langer and Derek Lemoine, "Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies," NBER Working Paper 24310 (2018), https://doi.org/10.3386/w24310.Download Citation
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Published Versions
Ashley Langer & Derek Lemoine, 2022. "Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol 9(6), pages 1197-1234.
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