Growth through Rigidity: An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay

Corresponding author: Kelly Shue, 5807 S. Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, IL 60637, USA, Tel: 773-834-0046, kelly.shue@chicagobooth.edu. We are grateful to William Schwert (the editor), an anonymous referee, Rajesh Aggarwal, Malcolm Baker, Vicente Cuñat, Xavier Gabaix, Robert Jackson, Dirk Jenter, Christine Jolls, Steve Kaplan, Augustin Landier, Ulrike Malmendier, Adair Morse, Kevin Murphy, Canice Prendergast, and Dick Thaler for helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at Adam Smith Workshop in Corporate Finance, ASU Sonoran Winter Finance Conference, BI Norwegian Business School, Copenhagen Business School, Chuo University International Workshop, Delaware Corporate Governance Symposium, Economics of Organizations Workshop, LBS Corporate Finance Symposium, Loyola University, Michigan State University, Minnesota Corporate Finance Conference, NBER (Behavioral Economics; Law and Economics), UC Davis, University of Chicago, University of Calgary, and University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign for helpful comments. We thank Matt Turner at Pearl Meyer, Don Delves at the Delves Group, and Stephen O’Byrne at Shareholder Value Advisors for helping us understand the intricacies of executive stock option plans. This research was funded in part by the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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