NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Democratic Rulemaking

John M. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz

NBER Working Paper No. 21765
Issued in November 2015
NBER Program(s):The Law and Economics Program

This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w21765

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