Public Debt Guarantees and Private Capital Flight
Significant amounts of private capital have flowed out of several of the more heavily indebted developing countries. This outflow, often called "capital flight ," largely escapes taxation by the borrowing-country government, and has generated concern about the prospects for future servicing of the debt. Imperfect contract enforcement may lead to implicit or explicit government guarantee of foreign debt. The model developed below demonstrates that a government policy of guaranteeing private debt can, in turn, generate more than one outcome. One such outcome replicates the allocation under perfect contract enforcement: national savings is invested domestically and foreign debt is repaid. The tax obligation implied by potential nationalization of private debt, however, can also lead to another outcome in which national capital flees and foreign debt may not be repaid.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w2172
Published: Eaton, Jonathan. "Public Debt Guarantees and Private Capital Flight," The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 377-395. (1987) citation courtesy of
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