NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
loading...

Firms' Sickness Costs and Workers' Sickness Absences

René Böheim, Thomas Leoni

NBER Working Paper No. 20305
Issued in July 2014
NBER Program(s):Economics of Aging

In many countries, social security insures firms against their workers' sickness absences. The insurance may create a moral hazard for firms, leading to inefficient monitoring of absences or to an underinvestment in the prevention of absences. We exploit an administrative threshold in the Austrian social security that defined whether a firm had to pay a deductible for its blue-collar workers sicknesses or not. The quasi-experimental situation around the threshold provides causal evidence on the extent of moral hazard induced by the deductible. We apply a regression discontinuity design to estimate the differences in the incidences and durations of sicknesses for firms that faced the deductible and those who did not. We find that the deductible did not lead to different sickness outcomes and conclude that relatively low deductibles have little impact on forms' management of sicknesses.

download in pdf format
   (556 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w20305

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Bradford, Courtemanche, Heutel, McAlvanah, and Ruhm w20320 Time Preferences and Consumer Behavior
Schorfheide, Song, and Yaron w20303 Identifying Long-Run Risks: A Bayesian Mixed-Frequency Approach
Buch and Goldberg w20286 International Banking and Liquidity Risk Transmission: Lessons from Across Countries
Knight w20311 An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for The Midterm Gap
Backus, Ferriere, and Zin w20319 Risk and Ambiguity in Models of Business Cycles
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us