Evasive Shareholder Meetings
We study the location and timing of annual shareholder meetings. When companies move their annual meetings a great distance from headquarters, they tend to announce disappointing earnings results and experience pronounced stock market underperformance in the months after the meeting. Companies appear to schedule meetings in remote locations when the managers have private, adverse information about future performance and wish to discourage scrutiny by shareholders, activists, and the media. However, shareholders do not appear to decode this signal, since the disclosure of meeting locations leads to little immediate stock price reaction. We find that voter participation drops when meetings are held at unusual hours, even though most voting is done electronically during a period of weeks before the meeting convenes.
We appreciate helpful comments from Xi Li, Eric Roiter, Erin Smith, Ekkehard Wenger, and seminar participants at New York University. We thank Tumi Adebiyi for excellent research assistance. Part of this research was completed while Yermack was a visiting professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
- firms that held a shareholder meeting at least 50 miles from their headquarters and at least 50 miles from a major airport [experienced...
in "Journal of Corporate Finance" Volume 38, June 2016, Pages 318-334