A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering
Climate change is a global "free rider" problem because significant abatement of greenhouse gases is an expensive public good requiring international cooperation to apportion compliance among states. But it is also a global "free driver" problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril. This paper develops the main features of a "free driver" externality in a simple model based on the asymmetric consequences of type-I and type-II errors. I propose a social-choice decision architecture based on the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule and derive its basic properties. In the model this supermajority voting rule attains the socially optimal cooperative solution, which is a new theoretical result around which the paper is built.
Without tying them to the contents of this paper or implying that they neccesarily agree with it, I am grateful for useful critical comments to Scott Barrett, Richard Cooper, Vincent Crawford, Jerry Green, David Keith, Eric Maskin, Antony Millner, Hervé Moulin, Wilfried Rickels, and Gernot Wagner. I acknowledge funding from NSF. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering† Martin L. Weitzman Article first published online: 14 JUL 2015 DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12120 © The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015. Issue Cover image for Vol. 117 Issue 3 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics Early View (Online Version of Record published before inclusion in an issue) citation courtesy of