Identification in Matching Games
I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a production function, which gives the surplus from a match, are nonparametrically identified. In particular, the ratios of complementarities from multiple pairs of inputs are identified. Also, the ordering of production levels is identified.
Previous versions of these theorems circulated as part of the paper "Estimating Matching Games with Transfers", which now focuses only on estimation, not identification. I thank the National Science Foundation, the NET Institute, the Olin Foundation, and the Stigler Center for generous funding. Email: email@example.com. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Jeremy T. Fox, 2010. "Identification in matching games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 203-254, November. citation courtesy of