Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets
We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion, and prove that unemployment is minimized with perfect overlap: i.e., if two firms interview any common worker, they interview the exact same set of workers.
We thank Neil Thakral for exceptional research assistance, and Itay Fainmesser, Kyna Fong, Rachel Kranton, David McAdams, Michael Ostrovsky, Al Roth, Lones Smith, two anonymous referees and the editor for helpful comments. All errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Robin S. Lee & Michael Schwarz, 2017. "Interviewing in two-sided matching markets," The RAND Journal of Economics, vol 48(3), pages 835-855. citation courtesy of